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On March 18, 1965, a Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States was sub-
mitted to the member governments of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development for signature and ratification. By
September 14, 1966, 46 governments had signed the Convention and
20 had deposited their instruments of ratification. The Convention
has entered into force on October 14, 1966.1
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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the view of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.
The author has written on the same subject in the Journal de Droit Inter-
national (Clunet) 1966, p. 26, under the title: "La Convention pour le R~gle-
ment des Diff6rends Relatifs aux Investissements entre ttats et Ressortissants
d'autres ttats."
'Article 68(2). The text of the Convention and of the Accompanying
Report of the Bank's Executive Directors (hereinafter called the E.D. Report),
which is available on request to the IBRD, Washington, D.C., has been pub-
lished in IV International Legal Materials 524 (1965).
Legal literature concerning the Convention include the following: Broches,
"Development of International Law by the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development," Proceedings of the American Society of International
Law 33 (1965); Delaume, "La Convention pour le R~glement des Diff6rends
Relatifs aux Investissements entre Etats et Ressortissants d'autres Etats,"
Journal du Droit International 1966, 26; Hynning, "The World Bank's Plan
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes," 51 Am. Bar Ass. J. 558 (1965);
Sassoon, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of other States," 1 Israel Law Review 27 (1966); Sirefman,
64 International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 1
SID Convention /65
The result of several years of preparatory work,2 the Convention
provides for the establishment of an International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes. The Centre, though it is conceived as
one of the IBRD group of institutions,' will function as an autonomous
organization and will offer new facilities for the settlement of disputes
between states and foreign investors by means of conciliation and
arbitration.
The Convention is one of several proposals made to stimulate
the flow of private international capital.' Its originality resides in its
"The World Bank Plan for Investment Dispute Arbitration," 20 Arb. J. 168
(1965); Minoli, "Osservazioni sul Recente Progetto della Banca Internazionale
di Ricostruzione e Sviluppo per la Risoluzione Internazionale di Controversie,"
Rivista Dell'Arbitrato, 1965, pp. 113-120.
See also, the Report prepared by the Committee on International Law of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 20 The Record No. 6 (June
1965); Senate, 89th Congress, 2d Session, Executive Report No. 2.
2 Officially, the origin of the Convention goes back to the Resolution adopted
on September 18, 1962 at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Board of
Governors of the Bank, which requested the Bank's Executive Directors to
study the question.
Pursuant to this request, the Bank's staff under the direction of Mr. A.
Broches, the Bank's General Counsel, prepared a series of working papers
culminating in a draft Convention. Upon decision of the Executive Directors,
the draft Convention was discussed with legal experts designated by member
governments in a series of consultative meetings held on a regional basis from
December 1963 through May 1964, in Addis Ababa, Santiago de Chile, Geneva,
and Bangkok.
On the basis of the preparatory work and the views expressed at the con-
sultative meetings, the Executive Directors reported favorably to the Board of
Governors and the Board, at its Nineteenth Annual Meeting held in Tokyo,
in September 1964, and requested the Executive Directors to formulate a con-
vention. Keeping in mind "the desirability of arriving at a text which could be
accepted by the largest possible number of governments" (Resolution No.
214(c) of the Board of Governors), the Bank invited its members to designate
representatives to a Legal Committee which would assist the Executive Direc-
tors in their task. This Committee met in Washington from November 23
through December 11, 1964. The meeting was attended by the representatives
of 61 member countries.
8 Only members of the IBRD are entitled as a matter of right to accede to
the Convention. Other States may accede only if invited by the Administrative
Council (Article 67). The seat of the Centre will be at the principle office
of the IBRD (Article 2 of the Convention) and arrangements will be made for
the use of the IBRD's administrative facilities and services (Article 6(d) ). The
IBRD has decided to underwrite, with reasonable limits, the basic overhead
expenditure of the Centre for a period of years to be determined after the
Centre is established (E.D. Report, para. 17. See also Convention, Article 17).
See also text and notes 28 to 30 infra.
4Such is the case of the OECD's Draft Convention on the Protection of
Foreign Property and of multilateral investment assurance or guarantee schemes
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particular approach to the problem. Instead of attempting to define
the substantive rules applicable to foreign investments, the Convention
aims at achieving its objective by offering to States and foreign inves-
tors a permanent forum for the settlement of investment disputes.'
By providing international methods of settlement particularly adapted
to the nature of the disputes and the identity of the parties, and by
maintaining a careful balance between the interests of States and those
of foreign investors, the Convention can be a major step toward the
promotion of a climate of mutual confidence between States and
investors and the establishment of the Rule of Law in the field of
international investment.
I. Jurisdiction of the Centre
A. Prerequisites
Pursuant to Article 25 (1) of the Convention, the jurisdiction 8
of the Centre:
. . . shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment,
between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national
of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent
in writing to submit to the Centre.
The jurisdiction of the Centre is, therefore, based on three postu-
under consideration. See e.g., van Hecke, "Le Projet de Convention de l'OCDE
sur la Protection des Biens Etrangers," Revue Gdnerale du Droit International
Public 1964, 641; Brewer, "The Proposal for Investment Guarantees by an
International Agency," 58 Am. J. Int'l L. 62 (1964).
r As to proposals concerning the use of the facilities of the International
Chamber of Commerce and of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, see e.g.,
Bickstiegel, "Arbitration of Disputes between States and Private Enterprises in
the International Chamber of Commerce," 59 Am. J. Int'l L. 579 (1965);
Guyomar, "Le R~glement de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage Relatif aux
Conflits Internationaux entre Deux Parties dont lune seulement est un stat,"
Annuaire Franfais de Droit International 1962, 377; Sassoon, op. cit. note 1
supra, at p. 28.
See also, Ketcham, Jr., "Arbitration between a State and a Foreign Private
Party," Symposium, Rights and Duties of Private Investors Abroad, 403 (Int'l
and Comp. Law Center 1965).
6 Inasmuch as the Centre will not itself engage in conciliation or arbitration
activities and these will be performed by commissions and tribunals, the
term "jurisdiction of the Centre" is used in the Convention "as a convenient
expression to mean the limits within which the provisions of the Convention
will apply and the facilities of the Centre will be available for conciliation and
arbitration proceedings." (E.D. Report, para. 22).
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lates, namely: (1) the consent of the parties; (2) their identity; and
(3) the nature of the dispute.
1. Consent of the Parties. Consent of the parties is the "corner-
stone of the jurisdiction of the Centre." I In other words, the juris-
diction of the Centre rests upon a strictly voluntary basis. Ratification
of the Convention in no way compels a Contracting State to make
use of the facilities of the Centre. Any Contracting State is entirely
free to decide in the light of all relevant circumstances whether to
consent to the submission of existing or future investment disputes to
the jurisdiction of the Centre.
Investors enjoy a similar discretion. It is, therefore, not excluded
that, depending upon the nature of their investment, investors may
avail themselves of the provisions of the Convention or have recourse
to other means of settlement. Thus, if prevailing practice is any
indication of possible developments, it is conceivable that investors
engaged in the exploitation of natural resources in a foreign country
may make greater use of the facilities of the Centre than other inves-
tors, such as lenders, who may prefer to submit investment disputes
to judicial adjudication.8
Under the Convention, consent of the parties must be in writing
and its existence must be established when the Centre is seized.9 The
Convention, however, does not specify the type of instrument in which
consent may be expressed. Consent may result from appropriate pro-
visions in an investment agreement, such as a concession, a loan
contract, bonds, or any other contractual arrangement between inves-
tors and Contracting States or in a compromis regarding an existing
dispute. Consent does not have to be given in the same document.
Thus, a Contracting State might in an investment code or similar
legislation for the promotion of foreign investment accept the juris-
7E.D. Report, para. 23.
8 As to concessions and similar agreements, see e.g., Fatouros, Government
Guarantees to Foreign Investors (1962), at pp. 187-189; Kahn, "Probl~mes
Jurisdiques de l'Investissement dans les Pays de 'Ancienne Afrique Frangaise,"
Journal du Droit International 1965, 338 at pp. 377-379.
As to the practice of lenders, see e.g., Delaume, "Jurisdiction of Courts and
International Loans," 6 Am. J. Comp. L. 189 (1959) and "Jurisdictional
Aspects of International Loans," 3 Col. J. of Transnational L. 3 (1964);
Domke, "Dispute Settlement of International Loans," International Financing
and Investment 525 (1964).
9 Articles 25(1), 28(3) and 36(3).
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diction of the Centre for certain classes of investments,10 and the
investor might give his consent by accepting the offer in writing.
2. Identity of the Parties. The Convention requires that one
party be a Contracting State or a subdivision or agency designated by
a Contracting State, and that the other party be a national of another
Contracting State. Intergovernmental disputes and disputes wholly
between private parties are, therefore, excluded from the jurisdiction
of the Centre. So are also disputes between a Contracting State and
one of its own nationals," subject, however, to an important excep-
tion in the case of corporations or other juridical entities. Even though
a juridical person had the nationality of the State party to the dispute
(e.g. because it was locally incorporated) on the date on which the
parties consented to submit an investment dispute to conciliation or
arbitration, it may nevertheless be eligible to be a party to conciliation
or arbitration proceedings under the auspices of the Centre if the host
State has agreed that, because of foreign control, the juridical person
involved should be treated as a national of another Contracting State. 2
This element of flexibility may well provide a broader scope to the
Convention by enabling the parties to make the necessary adjustments
in the light of their particular needs.
A similar, though possibly less apparent, consideration explains
the rather broad reference made in Article 25(1) to "constituent
subdivisions" and "agencies" of a Contracting State as possible parties
to proceedings for the settlement of investment disputes. Admittedly,
these expressions may have different connotations in different coun-
tries, and in particular in federal as opposed to unitary states. How-
10 See in this connection Article 25(4) according to which a Contracting
State may make known to the Centre, in advance, the classes of disputes
which it would or would not consider submitting to the Centre. This provision
makes clear that a notification by a Contracting State that it would consider
submitting a certain class of disputes to the Centre would serve for the purpose
of information only and would not constitute the consent required to give the
Centre jurisdiction.
11 Article 25(2) (a). This ineligibility applies also to dual nationals to the
extent that one of their nationalities is that of the State party to the dispute.
The ineligibility is absolute and cannot be cured even with the consent of the
State party to the dispute.
Since the Convention requires that the investor be a "national" of a Con-
tracting State, it follows that the facilities of the Centre might not be available
to "stateless" persons.
12 Article 25(2) (b). For similar solution in the investment codes of French
speaking African States, see Kahn, op. cit. note 8 supra, at pp. 350-355.
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ever, after extensive comparative research, 8 it became apparent to
the drafters of the Convention that any further attempt to use more
specific language would not only be unsuccessful but would probably
defeat its purpose by making the Convention unacceptable to states
whose institutions would not fit exactly under the concepts defined
in the Convention. Under the circumstances, the drafters of the Con-
vention wisely decided that each Contracting State should be free to
make the necessary determination by designating to the Centre the
particular entities which it considered eligible to become parties to
proceedings under the auspices of the Centre.'
3. Nature of the Dispute. The jurisdiction of the Centre is lim-
ited to a "legal dispute arising directly out of an investment." Of
these two requirements, the one concerning the existence of a direct
link between the dispute and an investment is, in view of the specific
purpose of the Convention, self-explanatory. The second requirement
concerning the "legal" nature of the dispute is intended to exclude
from the jurisdiction of the Centre disputes which would have a
political character or conflicts of interests between the parties, such
as those concerning the opportunity to renegotiate the terms of an
existing investment.
The fact, however, that the dispute must directly concern the
determination of the particular legal rights of the parties or the conse-
quences of a breach of legal obligations does not mean that disputes
concerning the existence of a specific factual situation are outside the
jurisdiction of the Centre. To the extent that the determination of a
factual situation would have legal implications, it would fall within
the jurisdiction of the Centre. 5
18 Both as a result of the preparatory work done by the legal staff of the
IBRD and of the discussions at the regional consultative meetings and at the
meeting of the Legal Committee. See note 2 supra.
14 The question whether consent by a constituent subdivision or an agency
of a Contracting State to submit a dispute to the Centre required the approval
of that State raised a similar issue. In view of the many systems prevailing
in the IBRD member countries, it was finally decided that such approval would
be required, unless the Contracting State notified the Centre that no such
approval was necessary. See Article 25(3).
1" Assuming, for example, that under a concession, a foreign investor un-
dertakes to bring production to a certain level by a certain date and that the
parties disagree as to whether that level has been reached by the agreed time.
This dispute, though it relates to facts, has nevertheless clear legal implications
since its adjudication may affect the respective rights and obligations of the
parties and justify or not a possible termination of the concession or such other
sanctions against the investor as may have been agreed upon in the concession.
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The term "investment" is not defined in the Convention. This
omission is intentional. To give a comprehensive definition, such as
that which is sometimes found in investment codes,'" would have
been of limited interest since any such definition would have been too
broad to serve a useful purpose. In addition to the difficulty of recon-
ciling many different concepts, insistence upon a precise formulation
would have been inconvenient in that it might have arbitrarily limited
the scope of the Convention by making it impossible for the parties
to refer to the Centre a dispute which would be considered by the
parties as a genuine "investment" dispute though such dispute would
not be one of those included in the definition in the Convention.
For these reasons, and in view of the fact that submission of a
dispute to the jurisdiction of the Centre requires the mutual consent
of the parties, it appeared appropriate to recognize that the elimination
of any definition from the text of the Convention was, in final analysis,
the best solution. 7
The same reasoning would apply in the event that the foreign investor would
be prevented from conducting business because of a state of affairs allegedly
provoked or condoned by the host State.
18 See Kahn, op. cit., note 8 supra, at pp. 343 et seq.
'1 E.D. Report, para. 27. See also, U.S. Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd Session,
Executive Report No. 2, p. 15:
"The convention states in article 25(1) that the center shall have jurisdic-
tion over any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment. The term
'investment' is not defined in the convention; although an earlier draft of
the convention defined the term 'investment' as a contribution of money or
other asset of economic value for an indefinite period or, if the period be
defined, for a period of not less than 5 years.
"During negotiations on the convention among the members of the
Bank, it was decided to delete this definition and to leave the term undefined.
This decision was based on the following reasons:
"1. The proposed definition would have excluded short-term projects of
less than 5 years' duration, even though there could be substantial invest-
ments of less than 5 years' duration which should not be excluded from the
scope of the convention, such as large construction projects. It would have
been very difficult in a definition to distinguish between those short-term
investments which should fall within the scope of the convention and those
short-term transactions which should not. Since the submission of a dispute
to arbitration requires the mutual consent of the private investors and the
host government, it would be more appropriate to let them agree among
themselves on the content they wish to give the term 'investment.'
"2. The jurisdiction of the center is given broader scope by leaving the
term 'investment' undefined. For example, the parties might wish to arbitrate
a dispute, and the arbitrators might consider that the particular dispute before
them was an investment dispute, but nevertheless the latter might feel obliged
to refuse the exercise jurisdiction because the facts did not come within a
International Lawyer, Vol. 1, No. 1
SID Convention /71
B. Effect of Consent: Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
1. The Effect of Consent. Pursuant to Article 26 of the Con-
vention, consent of the parties to arbitration under the Convention is
construed as a renunciation of any other remedy. This rule of inter-
pretation is reasonable. Where a State and an investor agree to have
recourse to arbitration, it may be presumed that, in the absence of
any reservation in their agreement, they intended to exclude recourse
to any other means of settlement. This presumption, however, is
rebuttable. Under the terms of Article 26, a Contracting State may,
as a condition of its consent to arbitration under the Convention,
require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies.
Thus, the Convention does not modify the rules of international law
concerning the exhaustion of local remedies.
The major contribution made by the Convention on the develop-
ment of international law is twofold. First, the Convention expressly
acknowledges the binding character of agreements between private
persons and foreign States to submit to conciliation or arbitration
under the auspices of the Centre. Once given, such consent cannot
be withdrawn unilaterally.18 This fundamental principle is referred
to in several articles of the Convention that are intended to make sure
that the proceedings will not be frustrated by the unwillingness of a
party to cooperate 11 and provide for an effective sanction against the
particular definition of 'investment.' This would be far less likely to occur
if 'investment' is not defined in the convention.
"It is entirely clear from this negotiating history that the term 'investment'
in article 25(1) of the convention does not exclude from its scope an invest-
ment simply because it is a short-term investment. It is also clear from the
negotiating history that the term 'investment' is to be broadly construed.
"For example, an 'investment' within the meaning of the convention could
include, though it would not be limited to, a loan by a private foreign investor
of one country to the government of another country, or a transfer to a new
or existing enterprise in a host country of loan or equity capital, industrial
property rights or services. Such a transfer might be, but need not have been,
made pursuant to an agreement between the investor and the host govern-
ment to submit any future controversy to arbitration, although there would
have to be such an agreement before a dispute could be submitted to
arbitration under the convention."
18 Article 25(1). Denunciation of the Convention by a Contracting State
cannot affect the binding character of a consent given by that State (or by one
of its national, a constituent subdivision or an agency) before the date of the
denunciation (Article 72).
19 See Articles 29 and 30, and 37 and 38 regarding the power of the Chairman
to appoint conciliators and arbitrators in the absence of agreement between the
parties or failure by any one of them to make the necessary appointment.
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possible breach of its obligations by one party.20 Secondly, the Con-
vention, unlike other recent proposals,2 ' for the first time acknowledges
the right of private investors to seek, as domini litis, the adjudication
of their claims against a Contracting State, without any possible
interference by the State of which they are nationals. Within the
framework of the Convention the latter State can neither compel its
nationals to submit nor refrain from submitting or discontinue the
submission of an investment dispute against another Contracting State.
As a counterpart to the prerogative thus conferred upon private
investors, the Convention assures the Contracting State party to an
investment dispute that, so long as it complies with its own obligations
and honors the arbitral award rendered in the dispute, it cannot be
exposed to diplomatic or other claims from the Contracting State
whose national is also a party to the dispute.22
2. Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards. Article
53 (1) declares that the parties are bound by the award and that each
of them must abide by and comply with the terms of the award. This
rule simply reflects the consensual character of proceedings under the
auspices of the Centre and the principle that the parties must comply
with their obligations in good faith.
This article, in accordance with the prevailing practice in con-
nection with international arbitration, imposes specific obligations
upon the parties and, in particular, binds the State party to the dispute
to give effect to the award. However, no provision for the practical
enforcement of arbitral awards in the territories of Contracting States
20 A breach by a Contracting State of its obligations under the Convention
would be exposed to the sanctions provided for in Article 27 (diplomatic
action by the government of the investor party to the dispute) and in Article 64
(proceedings before the ICJ).
Another sanction, which may affect both investors and States is the right
of any party to the dispute to obtain a default award (Article 45) which is
binding and enforceable in accordance with the provisions of the Convention
(Article 53 to 55).
21 See in particular the OECD's Draft Convention on the Protection of
Foreign Property (Article 7). According to that provision, a national of a
Contracting State may not institute arbitral proceedings against another Con-
tracting State unless, among other conditions, it is established that the State of the
plaintiff has no intention to espouse the claim of its national and to bring
such claim directly before an international tribunal. Again, if arbitral pro-
ceedings have been instituted by the national of a Contracting State, that
State remains free, at any time of the proceedings, to institute proceedings in
its own name thereby suspending the original arbitral proceedings until the
proceedings instituted by such State are terminated.
22 Article 27.
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is made in Article 54 which requires that each Contracting State must
recognize an award rendered pursuant to the Convention as binding
and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within
its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.
A Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an
award in or through its federal courts and may provide that such
courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts
of a constituent State.23
The procedure for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards rendered under the auspices of the Centre is made as simple
as possible. Under Article 54(2) of the Convention, any party to an
arbitral award may obtain recognition and enforcement of an award
by furnishing to the competent court or other authority designated
for the purpose by each Contracting State, a copy of the award certi-
fied by the Secretary-General of the Centre.
The originality and the merits of this solution are apparent.2'
It constitutes major progress over existing rules concerning the recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign or international awards. Further-
more, the lack of any distinction, for the purposes of recognition and
enforcement, between awards rendered against an investor or a Con-
tracting State maintains the careful balance between the respective
interests of both States and investors, which is one of the major
features of the Convention. This last remark must, however, be
qualified, since Article 55 provides that the principle formulated in
Article 54 cannot be construed as derogating from the law in force
in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or any
foreign State from execution. In view of the differences in this respect
among municipal legal systems, it is, therefore, possible that arbitral
awards rendered under the Convention will be subject to a different
treatment from one country to another.
This solution, which could not be avoided given the present
status of the law, is not necessarily as regrettable as it might appear.
First of all, there are a number of situations in which the doctrine
23 This provision may require implementing legislation in certain Contract-
ing States. As to the United States, see U.S. Senate, 89th Congress, 2d Session,
Executive Report No. 2, p. 6 and p. 30.
24 In respect to the recognition and enforcement of the judgments of the
Court of Justice of the EEC, cf. Stein and Hay, "Legal Remedies of Enterprises
in the European Economic Community," 9 Am. J. Comp. L. 375 (1960), p.
380. See also, Schachter, "The Enforcement of International Judicial and
Arbitral Decisions," 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1960) p. 13, note 34.
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of immunity should cause no problem because the award is self-
executory. Such is the case, for example, of awards leading to a
determination of facts or acknowledging the validity of an act already
done by one of the parties to the dispute, or deciding that a dispute
is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre.25
Secondly, it should be noted that the limitation contained in
Article 55, though intended to account for existing differences in the
laws of Contracting States, in no way relieves them of their obligations
under the Convention. Thus, it is clear that if a Contracting State party
to the dispute invoked its immunity to prevent the enforcement of
the award in its own territories or, to the same end, availed itself of
the doctrine of immunity prevailing in another Contracting State in
which enforcement would be sought, it would be in violation of its
obligation to comply with the award and would expose itself to the
various sanctions provided for in the Convention."
H. Institutional Machinery: Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings
A. Organization of the Centre
The Centre will not itself engage in conciliation or arbitration
activities. These will be performed by conciliation commissions or
arbitral tribunals constituted in accordance with the pertinent provi-
sions of the Convention. The purpose of the Centre is essentially "to
provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment dis-
putes . . ." 2" and more generally to assure the practical implementa-
tion of the Convention. It was, therefore, possible to give to the
Centre a simple organizational structure. The organs of the Centre
are the Administrative Council and the Secretariat.
The Administrative Council consists of one representative of each
Contracting State who, in the absence of a contrary designation, will
be the governor of the IBRD appointed by the Contracting State.2 8
Each representative casts one vote and matters before the Council are
decided by a majority of the votes cast, unless a different majority
is required by the Convention.29 The President of the IBRD is ex
25 Comp., Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication (1964), pp.
688-690.
28 Articles 27 and 64.2 7 Article 1(2).
28 Article 4. Members of the Administrative Council serve without remunera-
tion from the Centre (Article 8).29 Article 7(2) and (4); Article 6(a), (b), (c) and (f); Article 10.
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officio the Chairman of the Administrative Council but has no vote."
The principal functions of the Administrative Council are the election
of the Secretary-General and his deputies, the adoption of the budget
of the Centre, and the adoption of administrative and financial regu-
lations rules governing the institution of proceedings and rules of
procedure for conciliation and arbitration proceedings. 1
The Secretariat is composed of a Secretary-General, one or more
Deputy Secretaries-General and a staff. Upon nomination by the
Chairman, the Secretary-General and his Deputies are elected by a
majority of two-thirds of the members of the Administrative Council.
Their terms of service are limited to a period not exceeding six years
though they may be re-elected. 2
The Convention requires the Secretary-General to perform a
variety of administrative functions as legal representative, registrar,
and principal officer of the Centre. 8 In addition, the Convention gives
to the Secretary-General the power to "screen" requests for concilia-
tion or arbitration proceedings and to refuse registration of a request
(and thereby prevent the institution of the proceedings) if, on the
basis of the information contained in the request, he finds that the
dispute in question is "manifestly outside" the jurisdiction of the
Centre."4
Article 3 requires the Centre to maintain a Panel of Conciliators
30 Article 5. The Chairman serves without remuneration from the Centre
(Article 8).
81 Article 6.
32 Article 10(1). The initial election may be for a short term so as not to
deprive the States which ratify the Convention after its entry into force of the
possibility of participating in the selection of the high officials of the Centre
(E.D. Report, para. 18).
Article 10(2) provides that the offices of Secretary-General and Deputy
Secretary-General shall be incompatible with the exercise of any political
function. Neither the Secretary-General nor any Deputy Secretary-General
may hold any other employment or engage in any other occupation except
with the approval of the Administrative Council. •
33Articles 7(1), 11, 16(3), 25(4), 28, 36, 49(1), 50(1), 51(1), 52(1),
54(2), 59, 60(1), 63(b), and 65.
84 Articles 28(3) and 36(3). According to the E.D. Report (para. 20) this
power was given to the Secretary General "with a view to avoiding the embar-
rassment to a party (particularly a State) which might result from the insti-
tution of proceedings against it in a dispute which it had not consented to
submit to the Centre, as well as the possibility that the machinery of the
Centre would be set in motion in cases which for other reasons were obviously
outside the jurisdiction of the Centre, e.g., because either the applicant or the
other party was not eligible to be a party in proceedings under the Convention."
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 1
76/ INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
and a Panel of Arbitrators which are to consist of qualified persons
designated in part by each Contracting State and in part by the Chair-
man of the Administrative Council." In particular, Article 14 seeks
to ensure that Panel members will possess a high degree of compe-
tence in the fields of law, commerce, industry, or finance and be
capable of exercising independent judgment. Furthermore, the same
provision requires the Chairman to pay due regard, in making the
proper designation, to the importance of assuring representation on
the Panel of the principal legal systems of the world and of the main
forms of economic activity. 8
B. Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings
Certain provisions of the Convention are mandatory. These in-
clude provisions intended to prevent the frustration of the proceed-
ings,8" or to assure respect for certain rules deemed essential to the
success of the proceedings. Examples of such provisions are various
articles concerning the number of conciliators or arbitrators 18 and
their nationality," and the rendition, interpretation, revision, and
amendment of awards. 0
To account for the many situations which may surround con-
ciliation or arbitration proceedings and which necessitate to leaving
to the parties great discretion regarding the constitution of conciliation
commissions or arbitral tribunals and the conduct of the proceedings,
many provisions of the Convention are permissive and apply only in
the absence of contrary agreement by the parties. Thus, the Conven-
tion provides that, in the absence of agreement on the number of
85 Articles 13, 15 and 16.
38 Under Articles 31 and 40 the parties are free to appoint conciliators and
arbitrators from outside the Panels. However, the persons so appointed by
the parties must possess the qualities required by Article 14(1) from persons
designated to serve on the Panels.
87 See text and notes 19 and 20 supra.
88 Thus, Articles 29(2) and 37(2) require that, unless the parties have
agreed to conciliation or arbitration by a sole conciliator or arbitrator, the
conciliation commission or the arbitral tribunal must consist of an uneven
number of arbitrators.
89 Article 39 requires that the majority of the members of an arbitral tribunal
should not be nationals of either the State party to the dispute or the State
whose national is a party to the dispute. This rule is likely to have the effect
of excluding persons having these nationalities from serving on a tribunal
composed of not more than three members. However, the rule will not
apply if each and every member of the tribunal is appointed by agreement
of the parties.
41 Articles 48 to 52.
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conciliators or arbitrators and the method of their appointment, the
conciliation commission or the arbitral tribunal shall consist of three
arbitrators, one conciliator or arbitrator appointed by each party and
the third appointed by mutual agreement, or, failing such agreement,
by the Chairman of the Administrative Council." Similarly, Articles
33 and 44 stipulate that, unless the parties otherwise agree, concilia-
tion and arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the Convention and of the Conciliation
or Arbitration Rules adopted by the Administrative Council and in
effect on the date on which the parties consented to conciliation or
arbitration.'"
Article 42 is of particular importance. It provides that invest-
ment disputes are to be decided in accordance with such "rules of law"
as may be agreed by the parties or, failing such agreement, in accord-
ance with the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute and
such rules of international law as may be applicable. While this pro-
vision is a clear recognition of the principle of party autonomy, it is
also a good reminder that party autonomy can operate only within the
framework of surrounding "rules of law." This writer construes the
provision as an implicit rejection of proposals that contracts between
States and foreign investors could be legally self-sufficient and exist
independently of other, legal systems, municipal or international.'8
If this is the correct interpretation, the determination of the legal
system or systems which can be selected by the parties as applicable
to their relations becomes of paramount importance. That the parties
are free to choose municipal law as the law applicable, wholly or in
part, to the dispute is clear. The real question, therefore, is whether
the parties, one of whom is a State, can withdraw the dispute from the
sphere of municipal law and make it subject to another legal system
which may be international law in its traditional sense or some inter-
national system of law, such as the general principles of law (to the
41 Articles 29(2) (b) and 30; Articles 37(2) (b) and 38.
42 Articles 33 and 44.
4 3See Verdross, "Protection of Private Property under Quasi-International
Agreements," 6 Nederlands Tijdschri/t voor Internationaal Recht 335 (1959);
Bourquin, "Arbitration and Economic Development Agreement," 15 Business
Lawyer 860 (1960); Ray, "Law Governing Contracts between States and
Foreign Nationals," Proceedings of the 1960 Institute on Private Investment
Abroad (1960), p. 5.
But see Mann, 'The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International
Persons," 35 British Year Book of International Law 34 (1959), p. 49; Fried-
mann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964), p. 175.
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extent that they could be distinguished from international law), trans-
national law or a new lex mercatoria in the making." As yet, there
is no clear answer to this question. All that can be said in this respect
is that, inasmuch as the Convention requires the arbitral tribunal to
apply municipal as well as international law, it would be strange
indeed if the parties were to be denied the power, by agreement
between them, to bring their relations within a system of law, namely
international law, that the tribunal is under a duty to apply.
Under Article 42, the tribunal must, in the absence of contrary
agreement between the parties, decide investment disputes in accor-
dance with the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute and
such rules of international law as may be applicable. It is therefore
possible that an investment dispute may be governed either by the law
of the Contracting State, international law or, in various degrees, by
both systems of law."
Subject to the possible application of international law, the rule
that an investment dispute should be decided in accordance with the
law of the Contracting State party to the dispute makes sense. In
most cases, at least where the investment involved relates to the exploi-
tation of mineral or other resources in the territories of the host
country, all connecting factors point to the applicability of the law of
the host State. Whether that law should be applied as lex loci con-
tractus or lex loci solutionis is in fact irrelevant.
4 See e.g., Mann, op. cit. preceding note; McNair, "The General Principles
of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations," 33 British Year Book of International
Law 1 (1957); Jessup, Transnational Law (1956), 102 et seq.; Fatouros, op.
cit. note 8 supra, pp. 288 et seq.; Delaume, "The Proper Law of Loans Con-
cluded by International Persons: a Restatement and a Forecast," 56 Am. J.
Int'l L. 63 (1962), pp. 78 et seq.; Lalive, "Un R6cent Arbitrage Suisse entre
un Organisme d'8tat et une Soci&6 Priv6e Etrang~re," Annuaire Suisse de Droit
International 1962, 273, "Contracts between a State or a State Agency and
a Foreign Company-Theory and Practice: Choice of Law in a New Arbitra-
tion Case," 13 Int'l and Comp. Law Q. 987 (1964); van Hecke, Problmes
Juridiques des Emprunts Internationaux (2d ed. 1964) pp. 76 et seq.; Goldman,
Les Conflits de Lois dans l'Arbitrage International de Droit Privg, 109 Recueil
des Cours, Hague Academy, 351 (1963); Kahn, op. cit. note 8 supra, pp. 384
et seq.; Suratgar, "Considerations Affecting Choice of Law Clauses in Con-
tracts between Governments and Foreign Nationals," 2 Indian J. Int'l L. 273
(1962).
,5The E.D. Report specifies that:
"The term 'international law' as used in this context should be understood
in the sense given to it by Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, allowance being made for the fact that Article 38 was
designed to apply to inter-State disputes" (para. 40).
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The rule, however, is qualified in one respect. If, under the con-
flict of laws rules of the Contracting State party to the dispute, the law
of some other country is applicable, it is that law which must be
applied by the tribunal. This last solution is far from theoretical. In
the case of such investments as loans or similar financial arrange-
ments between private investors and foreign public entities, the pre-
vailing practice is to subject, either expressly or implicitly, the loan
relationship to the law of the lenders' country."8 In cases such as
these, it is thus possible that the tribunal, after ascertaining the con-
flict rules of the debtor State, will be referred to the law of the
lenders' country or of the market of issue.
Another delicate issue, which is not settled in the Convention, is
one which relates directly to the time element in the determination
of the content of the legal rules applicable to the dispute. Assuming
that the applicable law has changed between the time consent to the
jurisdiction of the Centre was given and the time when a dispute
must be decided, should the tribunal's decision be based on the
applicable law as it stood at the time of consent or as it exists at
the time of adjudication?
According to the prevailing view, the latter date ought to be
determinative.," However, this view does not go unchallenged when
the applicable law is that of the State party to the dispute.' 8 At least
in the absence of an express stipulation, such as a "stabilization" clause
sometimes found in concessions freezing the legal status of the
relations between foreign private investors and the host State, it is
not clearly established whether a State should be held responsible
for the damaging consequences to the investors of a change in its
legislation.'" This is an issue which arbitral tribunals will no doubt
40 See Delaume, op. cit. note 44 supra; Broches, "Choice of Law Provisions
in Contracts with Governments," International Contracts: Choice of Law and
Language (1962), p. 64.
47 See Batiffol, Les Conflits de Lois en Matire de Contrats (1938), p. 68;
Gavalda, Les Conflits dans le Temps en Droit International Privg (1955), pp.
360-362, 385-389; Mann, 'Time Element in the Conflict of Laws," 31 British
Yearbook of International Law 217 (1954); Spiro, "The Incidence of Time in
the Conflict of Laws," 9 Int'l and Comp. Law Q. 357 (1960). See, however,
the Alsing Case, 23 Int'l Law Reports (1956), 633.
48 See e.g., Mann, "State Contracts and State Responsibility," 54 Am. J.
Int'l L. 572 (1960); Jennings, "State Contracts in International Law," 37
British Yearbook of International Law 156 (1961); Fatouros, op. cit. note
8 supra, pp. 261-301.
49 Though the issue was brought up before the PCIJ (Losinger Case, Series
C, No. 78, 1936) and the ICJ (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, Reports
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have to decide in the light of the relevant rules of international law
to which their decision may make a significant contribution.
Conclusion
Though the arbitral aspects of the Convention have, in the fore-
going pages, been considered at greater length than the provisions
concerning conciliation, this is due only to the fact that the legal
issues of arbitration are more complex than those likely to arise in
the process of concilation. This is not intended, however, to sug-
gest that conciliation, given its flexibility, may not prove in practice
more significant than arbitration as an effective method of settling
investment disputes.
It is clearly premature to attempt any forecast of the use that
investors and States will make of the machinery set up by the Con-
vention. It is safe to say, however, that the attempt made in the
Convention to reconcile the respective interests of both investors and
States should be particularly helpful in promoting the climate of
mutual confidence which is an essential prerequisite to the flow of
private capital of a developmental character.
1952, 93; Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, Reports 1957, 9 and Pleadings,
vol. I, pp. 34, 404, 485 and vol. II, pp. 61 and 134), the Hague Court has not
passed judgment on the merits.
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